Much is known about heterogeneity in social preferences and about heterogeneity in lying aversion -but little is known about the relation between the two at the individual level. Are the altruists simply upright persons who do not only care about the well-being of others but also about honesty? And are the sel…sh those who lie whenever lying maximizes their material payo¤? This paper addresses those questions in experiments that …rst elicit subjects'social preferences and then let them make decisions in an environment where lying increases the own material payo¤ and has either consequences for the payo¤s of others or no consequences for others. We …nd that altruists lie less when lying hurts another party but we do not …nd any evidence in support of the hypothesis that altruists are more (or less) averse to lying than others in environments where lying has no e¤ects on the payo¤s of others.
Introduction
Communication is an essential feature of human interaction and in particular of economic activity. Whenever communication is involved, some agents might have material incentives to misrepresent their private information at the expense of other market participants. Examples include markets for experience goods, where sellers have incentives to claim that the quality of the good o¤ered by them is higher than it actually is (Nelson 1970) ; markets for label goods, where …rms are tempted to assert that their products posses hidden attributes valued by consumers (Feddersen and Market and non-market forces often prevent agents from making false claims despite short-run material incentives for misreporting. For instance, sellers in markets for experience good may resist the temptation to lie because they fear to loose business in the future (Huck et al. 2016 ); …rms in markets for label goods might stay honest because they are afraid that mislabeled products are detected and punished with a high enough probability (Etilé and Teyssier 2016) ; and experts in markets for credence goods might act in line with the interests of consumers to avoid a bad reputation (Grosskopf and Gibson et al. (2013) , among others -suggests that some agents avoid making false claims even in environments where lying is di¢ cult or even impossible to detect -or is not punished when detected. By contrast, others seem to cheat whenever cheating is in their material self-interest. A possible explanation for this …nding is that it is the result of lying costs which di¤er across agents (see Gneezy Agents di¤er not only in their willingness to tell a lie, they also di¤er in their propensity to take the material consequences for others into account when making economic decisions. Indeed, experimental work by Andreoni and Miller (2002) , Engelmann and Strobel (2004) , Fisman et al. (2007) , Cox and Sadiraj (2012) and Kerschbamer (2015) documents large heterogeneity in the distributional -or 'social'-preferences of subjects, with some agents deciding as if they were only interested in their own material payo¤s while others seem to care to di¤erent degrees for the payo¤s of others or for fairness 1 more generally. 1 Although heterogeneity in lying aversion and heterogeneity in social preferences are by now well documented, relative little is known about the relationship between the two at the individual level. Do altruistic persons lie less than others -for instance, because they are simply more "moral" persons? And do sel…sh persons lie whenever lying maximizes their material payo¤ -simply because they do not care for moral values at all? This paper addresses those questions with the help of controlled laboratory experiments. Speci…cally, we present evidence from experiments that …rst elicit subjects' social preferences and then let them make decisions in an environment where lying increases the own material payo¤ and has either consequences for the payo¤s of others or no consequences for the payo¤s of others.
Eliciting social preferences is a thorny task. In our experiments we use a simple and intuitive approach -the Equality Equivalence Test (Kerschbamer 2015) . This test elicits benevolence in two domains of income allocationsthe domain of advantageous inequality where the decisions maker is ahead of another person, and the domain of disadvantageous inequality where the decision maker is behind. According to the revealed benevolence, neutrality or malevolence of the decision maker in the two domains, she or he is classi…ed into a distributional preference type.
Di¤erent methods haven been applied to identify lying aversion in the aggregate or on the individual level. A simple and elegant design has been introduced to the literature by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013): Subjects roll a dice in privacy, report the outcome and get paid based exclusively on their report. Since the experimenter knows the underlying distribution of outcomes, cheating behavior in the aggregate can readily be quanti…ed with this design. The approach is less well suited for the identi…cation of lying aversion at the individual level.
A second strand of literature, pioneered by Gneezy (2005) , builds on the cheap talk game by Crawford and Sobel (1982) to identify lying behavior on the individual level. In this class of games, a sender learns the true state of the world and then sends a costless message about the state to the receiver. The receiver observes the message of the sender and then chooses an action. After this choice the game ends with payo¤s for the two players that depend only on the state of the world and the choice of the receiver, but not on the message sent by the sender. Only the sender is aware about the monetary consequences for both players associated with each choice of the receiver (even after the end of the game). As a consequence, the receiver can not anticipate if the sender has an incentive to transmit the information about the state honestly or not, and the receiver will never learn if the sender said the truth or not. 2 This paper investigates in experiments involving three treatments whether there is a relationship between the distributional preference type of a subject and his aversion against lying. In all treatments we …rst elicit subjects' social preferences via the Equality Equivalence Test. Depending on the treatment we then expose them either to a dice-rolling task à la Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) or to one of two versions of a deception game à la Gneezy (2005) .
In the original dice-rolling task as introduced by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) subjects are asked to roll a dice just once. By comparing the distribution of reports to the predicted distribution of outcomes the researcher receives information about the frequency and extend of lying in the aggregate. On the individual level, however, a reported outcome is only a noisy signal for whether the subject told the truth. To improve the information content of the signal we modify the Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) design slightly by asking the subjects to roll the dice ten times and to self-report the outcomes. The payo¤ of the subject then corresponds to the sum of self-reported outcomes. We term this the DICE treatment.
Our two versions of the deception game à la Gneezy (2005) have the properties that (i) the sender and the receiver face the same action spaces in both versions and (ii) the sender has the same material incentive to lie in both versions. The two versions -which correspond to the treatments NEG and NEU in our experiment -di¤er in the material consequences of lying for the receiver: In NEG a lie increases the material payo¤ of the sender and decreases the material payo¤ of the receiver and in NEU a lie only increases the material payo¤ of the sender and does not a¤ect the material payo¤ of the receiver. 3 The main result of our experiments involving 472 subjects is that altruists lie less when lying hurts the other party (as in the NEG version of the deception game), but do not lie less than others in environments where lying has no e¤ects on the payo¤s of others (as in DICE and in the NEU version of the deception game).
In terms of research question and experimental design the paper closest to ours is Maggian and Villeval (2016) . These authors investigate in an experiment involving three treatments the correlation between social preferences and lying aversion in children. Each of the three treatments has two stages. The choice in the …rst stage is used to identify the social preference type of the subject and the choice in the second stage is used to identify lying at the individual level. Speci…cally, in stage 1 subjects are asked to decide between two allocations, each involving an own material payo¤ and a material payo¤ for another subject. In all treatments, one of the two allocations involves an egalitarian distribution, the second allocation creates advantageous or disadvantageous inequality, depending on the treatment. In the Sel…shness treatment, by choosing the asymmetric allocation instead of the symmetric one, the subject increases the own material payo¤ but decreases that of the second subject, while in the Altruism and the E¢ ciency treatment choosing the asymmetric allocation increases the other subject's payo¤ either at an own cost (in the Altruism treatment) or at no own cost (in the E¢ ciency treatment). Depending on her choice, the subject is then assigned one of two distributional preference types. For instance, in the Sel…shness treatment, a subject choosing the asymmetric allocation instead of the symmetric one, is classi…ed as sel…sh while a subject deciding for the symmetric allocation is classi…ed as inequality averse. In all treatments the second stage involves the same two allocations as the …rst stage but now the computer randomly "proposes" one of the two allocations. Subjects are then asked to report the allocation proposed by the computer and the reported allocation is then implemented. 4 For the identi…cation of lying aversion in the second stage the authors restrict their attention to subjects where the computer-proposed allocation did not match the allocation chosen by the subject in stage 1. If such a subject reports the allocation she or he had chosen in stage 1, the choice of the subject is classi…ed as lying behavior. This means, that in the Sel…shness treatment subjects classi…ed as sel…sh can only tell a black lie (that is, a lie that harms the other side) while subjects classi…ed as inequality averse can only tell a white lie (i.e., a lie that bene…ts the other party). The authors …nd that black lies by sel…sh children are more frequent than white lies by pro-social children.
We view our work as complementary to this interesting research. An important di¤erence between studies is the social preference elicitation procedure employed: In Maggian and Villeval (2016) the elicitation task and the set of social preference types tested for vary across treatments while we use the same procedure and test for the same set of types in all our treatments. A second di¤erence between our design and theirs is that whether lying has negative or neutral consequences for another subject depends only on the treatment in our design, while it depends also on the social preference type of the subject in their design.
Other papers related to ours are Cappelen et al. (2013) and Sheremeta and Shields (2013) . Cappelen et al. (2013) conduct an experiment based on a sender-receiver game and examine how the decision to lie depends on factors like the content of the lie, the market context and personal characteristics of the sender. An important feature of their experiments is that lying is bene…cial for both the sender and the receiver in all of their treatments. An other important feature (in relation to our work) is that all subjects are asked to make a standard dictator decision before being exposed to the senderreceiver game. With respect to this decision the authors …nd that subjects who give higher shares in the dictator game show also a higher degree of lying aversion in the sender-receiver game. This …nding is remarkable because pro-social subjects have an additional incentive for lying compared to sel…sh subjects in their sender-receiver games where all lies are Pareto white lies. Sheremeta and Shields (2013) show that other-regarding preferences and lying aversion are also correlated in the context of sel…sh black lies. In their experiments subjects …rst play both roles in a sender-receiver game where senders observe with equal probability one of two signals and where they have a material incentive to lie when they see one of the two signals. If the lie is believed by the receiver then the sender is better o¤ and the receiver is worse o¤ compared to the truthful report of the sender. After having made the two decisions in the sender-receiver game, subjects face subsequently …rst a risk preference elicitation task and then a distributional preferences elicitation procedure. With respect to social preferences the authors …nd that ahead averse subjects tend to lie less in the sender-receiver game. 5 One possible interpretation of this …nding is that more pro-social subjects are more averse to lying. However, given that lying in their sender-receiver game is harmful for the receiver, their …nding is also consistent with the hypothesis that more pro-social subjects have the same lying aversion as others but lie less because lying hurts the other party. In this respect our experiments are an improvement because in addition to a sender-receiver game where lying hurts the receiver, we also have treatments where lying has no e¤ect on the payo¤s of others. This allows to discriminate between the two explanations for the …ndings by Sheremeta and Shields (2013) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the experimental design and the procedure. The hypotheses are formulated in Section 3. Section 4 presents the experimental results and Section 5 concludes. An appendix (not intended for publication) contains the experimen- 5 In the distributional preference elicitation procedure subjects are asked to make four choices between two allocations, each involving an own material payo¤ and a material payo¤ for another subject. As in the Equality Equivalence Test one of the two allocations involves an egalitarian distribution while the second allocation creates advantageous or disadvantageous inequality. Subjects are then classi…ed as either ahead-averse, or behindaverse and pro-social according to the choices in one or two of the four tasks. This means that a subject might end up in more than one of these classes or in none of them. 5 tal instructions.
Experimental Design and Procedure
Our experimental design involves three treatments implemented between subjects. Each treatment consists of two parts. In Part 1 of each treatment we elicit the distributional preferences of subjects by exposing them to the Equality Equivalence Test introduced by Kerschbamer (2015) . In Part 2 subjects are either exposed to a dice-rolling task à la Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) (treatment DICE ) or they play one of two versions of a deception game à la Gneezy (2005) (treatments NEG and NEU ).
Part 1: The Equality Equivalence Test
In the Equality Equivalence Test (called EET henceforth) each subject is exposed to a series of binary choices between allocations that both involve an own payo¤ for the decision maker and a payo¤ for a randomly matched anonymous second subject, the passive person. 6 In the version of the test implemented in our experiments subjects are exposed to ten binary choices. In each of the ten binary decision problems one of the two allocations is symmetric (i.e., egalitarian -giving the same material payo¤ to both agents) while the other one is asymmetric (involving unequal payo¤s for the two subjects). In half of the choice tasks the asymmetric allocation involves disadvantageous inequality (that is, the decision maker receives a lower material payo¤ than the second subject), while in the other half it involves advantageous inequality (that is, the decision maker receives a higher payo¤ than the second subject). In both domains the EET systematically varies the price of giving (or taking) by increasing the material payo¤ of the decision maker in the asymmetric allocation while keeping all other payo¤s constant. The ten binary choices were presented to subjects in two blocksas shown in Table 1 . 7 Given the design of the EET, a rational decision maker switches -in each block -at most once from the symmetric to the asymmetric allocation (and never in the other direction). 8 As shown by Kerschbamer (2015) the switching points in the two blocks can be used to construct a two-dimensional index representing the archetype of distributional concerns and preference intensity: The x-score (ranging from -2.5 to +2.5 in integer steps) measures pro-sociality in the domain of disadvantageous inequality, and the y-score (again ranging from -2.5 to +2.5 in integer steps) measures pro-sociality in the domain of advantageous inequality. In both domains a positive (negative) score means benevolence (malevolence) and a higher score means 'more benevolent' ('less malevolent'). Also, in both domains scores in {-0.5,0.5} are consistent with neutrality.
Combining the information about benevolence, neutrality or malevolence of a decision maker in the two domains allows classifying subjects into archetypes of distributional preferences. Speci…cally, we de…ne the following types:
ALT: a decision maker who has both scores positive and at least one of them strictly larger than 0.5 is classi…ed as altruist;
IAV: a decision maker who has the x-score negative and the y-score positive and has in addition either the x-score strictly below 0.5 or the y-score strictly above 0.5 is classi…ed as inequality averse; SEL: a decision maker who has both scores in {-0.5, 0.5} is classi…ed as sel…sh; OTHERS: subjects that do not fall in any of the categories de…ned above are classi…ed as 'others'. 9 
* T h e la b e ls " D isa d va nta g e o u s In e q u a lity B lo ck " a n d " A d va nta g e o u s In e q u a lity B lo ck " w e re n o t sh ow n to th e su b je c ts. For the DICE treatment we used a modi…ed version of the dice-rolling game by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013): Subjects were asked to throw a die in privacy ten times and to report the outcomes on the computer screen. Subjects were informed that they would receive the sum of the reported outcomes in ECUs as payment for this part of the experiment, with 5 ECUs = 1 Euro. The experimental environment was such that neither the experimenter nor any other subject could possibly observe the outcome of the die roll. This assures complete anonymity and gives subjects the possibility to cheat with virtually no costs of lying. The payment was carried out by a second person in absence of the experimenter to further reduce any possible demand e¤ects and this was common knowledge at the beginning of the experiment.
Treatments NEG and NEU : Two Versions of the Deception Game
For the NEG and the NEU treatment we used a modi…ed version of the deception game by Gneezy (2005) : At the start of each session we randomly assigned one of two roles to subjects, either the role of a sender or the role of a receiver. Then we informed subjects that we would randomly form pairs, each consisting of a sender and a receiver. 10 We then informed the senders that we have tossed a fair coin before the start of the experiment and that the outcome of the coin toss was HEADS. We also informed the sender that the payments to the two subjects in a pair would only depend on the action choice of the receiver. Speci…cally, the receiver in each pair has two available actions -HEADS and TAILS -and the payments to the two subjects as a function of the action chosen by the receiver were as shown in Table 2 . The sender was informed that his or her task in this part of the experiment was to send one of two possible messages to the receiver -either Message 1 or Message 2:
Message 1: "The outcome of the coin ‡ip is HEADS". Message 2: "The outcome of the coin ‡ip is TAILS".
The receiver observes the message sent by the sender and then has to choose which option (HEADS or TAILS) to implement without knowing the monetary consequences of the two options. It is important to note that at the end of the game, the receiver only learns his own payo¤ from the implemented option. The receiver does not learn the payo¤ of the sender from the implemented option nor the payo¤s of the option not implemented and all of this is common knowledge at the beginning of the game. Table 2 summarizes the monetary consequences of the two options for each treatment in Euros. 11 Option HEADS implements the same allocation -a material payo¤ of 2 Euros for the sender and one of 3 Euros for the receiver -in both treatments. Option TAILS implements the same payo¤ (of 3 Euros) for the sender in both treatments. So, the treatments di¤er only in the material consequences of option TAILS for the receiver. In NEG, the material consequence of option TAILS for the receiver is 2 Euros and in NEU, option TAILS implies a monetary payo¤ of 3 Euros for the receiver. Under the assumption that subjects are exclusively interested in their own material income, senders have an incentive to induce the receivers to choose TAILS in both treatments. The experiment was conducted with paper-and-pen (and several other design features reported below were applied) to convince subjects that neither other subjects nor the experimenters could identify the person who has made any particular decision. This was done in an attempt to minimize the impact of experimenter demand and audience e¤ects. 12 
Experimental Procedures
Sixteen experimental sessions were conducted at the University of Innsbruck from November 2011 to June 2014. 472 subjects from various academic backgrounds participated in total and each subject participated in one session only. The invitations were sent out using either the ORSEE recruiting system (Greiner 2004) After arrival subjects assembled in the laboratory and then instructions for Part 1 of the experiment -the EET -were distributed and read aloud. Instructions for the EET informed subjects that (i) their earnings for this part of the experiment would be determined at the end of the experiment; (ii) they would receive two cash payments for this task, one as a decision maker and one as a passive person; (iii) for their earnings as a decision maker one of the 10 decision problems would be selected randomly and the alternative chosen in that decision problem would be paid out; and (iv) their earnings as a passive person would come from another participant (that is, not from the passive person of the subject under consideration). After reading the instructions and answering questions from the subjects in private, subjects were asked to make their decisions for the EET.
Then the instructions for Part 2 of the experiment -either the DICE, the NEG or the NEU part, depending on the treatment -were distributed and read aloud. Instructions for DICE informed subjects that their payment for this part of the experiment would only depend on their own choice and that their own choice would not have any consequences for the payments of other subjects. Subjects were also informed that (i) their task in this part of the experiment was to roll a six-sided dice ten times and to selfreport the outcomes on the computer screen; (ii) the sum of the reported outcomes would determine their payment for this part of the experimentwith each point yielding an ECU and 5 ECUs translating in 1 Euro; and (iii) that cash payments will be carried out after the experiment by a third person, who is not informed about the experiment's procedure and content. After reading the instructions and answering questions from the subjects in private, subjects were asked to start with the experiment.
Instructions for the NEG and the NEU treatment informed subjects that (i) there are two roles in this part of the experiment, the role of a 'Group A member'and the role of a 'Group B member'; (ii) each Group A member is matched with exactly one Group B member and vice versa, and that at no point in time will a participant discover the identity of the person she/he is matched with; (iii) Group B members are informed about the outcome of a coin toss and Group A members are not; (iv) Group B members are called to send a message about the outcome of the coin toss to Group A members and that the choice of the message has no implications on the payo¤s of any of the two players; (v) Group A members are called to choose either 'HEADS' or 'TAILS' after observing the message from Group B members and that this choice determines the payo¤s for both players; (vi) Group A members know nothing about the payo¤ consequences for both players associated with each choice and that Group B members are aware about the payo¤ consequences for both players related to each choice of Group A members; (vii) Group A members will learn only their own payo¤ out of the chosen option and nothing else (even after the experiment ended); and (viii) cash payments could be collected a few days after the experiment from one of the secretaries together with the payments from Part 1 of the experiment. After reading the instructions and answering questions from the subjects in private, Group B members were handed out a decision sheet and an empty envelope and they were asked to …ll out the decision sheet in private. After the Group B members made their decisions, they put the decision sheets into the unmarked envelopes. Envelopes were then collected with a letterbox by an experimenter. Additionally, Group B members were asked to answer the following question: Q1: "Out of 100 Group A members, how many do you think follow the message of the paired Group B member on average?" 14 In the meantime another experimenter opened the envelopes of the Group B members (this was done in a third room without subjects) and transferred the messages of the Group B members on the decision sheets of the Group A members. Then, Group A members were handed out the decision sheets in an unmarked envelope randomly and they were asked to …ll out the decision sheet in private. After the Group A members made their decisions, they put the decision sheets into the unmarked envelopes and the envelopes were then collected with a letterbox by an experimenter. For the cash payments experimenters manually matched Group A with Group B members to compute the payo¤s.
Hypotheses
All our predictions are based on the null hypothesis that all distributional preference types have the same aversion against lying. This is only a working hypothesis, of course -ultimately, our main research questions is exactly whether distributional archetypes di¤er systematically in their lying aversion. We are agnostic about the nature of the lying aversion and simply assume -in line with much of the rest of the literature -that at least some subjects have such an aversion. 15 1 4 This question was incentivized in the following way: in each session we paid the subject whose answer was closest to the true value 5 Euros. 1 5 The homo oeconomicus from standard economics textbooks is assumed to lie whenever it is in his material interest to do so. It turned out that this view is too pessimistic and preferences for honesty have been taken into account: Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), Gneezy et al. (2013) and Gibson et al. (2013) argue that some agents never lie while others are sensitive in their lying to the material consequences for themselves and for others. Hurkens and Kartik (2009) argue that there are two kinds of people: Persons who never lie and persons who lie whenever it is their material interest to do so. Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) assume that some people are averse against lying because they feel guilty if they disappoint others'payo¤ expectations and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) formulate the related concept of 'guilt from blame' where a player cares about others' inferences regarding ones willingness to disappoint others'payo¤ expectations. Inferences
Prediction for DICE
Since in the dice-rolling task lying has only consequences for the own material payo¤ and not for the payo¤s of others and since distributional types are assumed to di¤er only in their attitude towards the material payo¤ of others our null hypothesis directly leads to the following prediction:
Hypothesis 1: There is no systematic di¤ erence across distributional preference types in the frequency and extend of lying in DICE.
Let o x stand for the average sum of reported outcomes in DICE among subjects classi…ed as being of distributional type x 2 fSEL; ALT; IAV g: Using this notation we test H1 by comparing o x across distributional preference types.
Prediction for NEU
Since in the NEU version of the deception game lying has only consequences for the own material payo¤ and not for the payo¤s of others and since distributional preference types are assumed to di¤er only in their attitude towards the material payo¤ of others our null hypothesis directly leads to the following prediction:
Hypothesis 2: There is no systematic di¤ erence across distributional preference types in the frequency of lying in NEU.
Let f x N EU stand for the frequency of message 'Tails' among subjects classi…ed as being of distributional type x 2 fSEL; ALT; IAV g in treatment NEU. Using this notation we test H2 by comparing f x N EU across types.
Prediction for NEG
Sel…sh subjects do not care for the material payo¤ of others, they simply maximize their own material payo¤. Since the payo¤ of the sender increases to the same extend by lying in NEG and in NEU, our null hypothesis leads directly to the following prediction:
There is no systematic di¤ erence in the frequency of lying of sel…sh subjects between NEG and NEU. Using the notation introduced above we test H3 by comparing f SEL N EG to f SEL N EU :
Altruistic subjects are willing to give up own material payo¤ to increase the material payo¤s of others. Since the payo¤ of the receiver is negatively a¤ected by lying in NEG but independent of the message in NEU our null hypothesis directly leads to the following prediction:
Hypothesis 4: The frequency of lying among altruistic subjects is lower in NEG than in NEU.
We will test this hypothesis by comparing f ALT N EG to f ALT N EU :
Inequality averse subjects are willing to give up own material payo¤ to increase the material payo¤s of others if they are better o¤ than the others, but they are also willing to give up own material payo¤ to decrease the material payo¤s of others if they are worse o¤ than the others. Since the material asymmetry disappears by lying in NEU but not in NEG our null hypothesis directly leads to the following prediction:
The frequency of lying among inequality averse subjects is lower in NEG than in NEU.
This hypothesis is tested by comparing f IAV N EG to f IAV N EU :
Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 together imply:
Hypothesis 6: The frequency of lying in NEG is higher for sel…sh subjects than for altruistic subjects and it is higher for sel…sh subjects than for inequality averse subjects. 
Aggregate Results: DICE
The average outcome of the throw of a fair die is 3.5. If cheating was not an issue the average outcome in DICE should therefore be 35. However, cheating occurred on a broad basis and the mean outcome in DICE di¤ers signi…cantly from 35 (mean = 43:11; p = 0:000, single sample T-test). On the one extreme are a fraction of 3.8 percent of subjects who report 6 for each of the10 die throws. On the other extreme there is a fraction of 37.1 percent of subjects who cannot be identi…ed as cheaters on a level of 85 percent. These …ndings are well in line with similar results in the literature (see Mazar et al. 2008 , for instance). Figure 2 shows the distribution of the sum of the reported throws and Figure 3 shows the relative frequencies of all reported die throws. 
Aggregate Results: NEG and NEU
The results of the two versions of the deception games aggregated over all distributional preference types are presented in Table 3 . The …gures in row [1] indicate the relative frequency of lying, i.e. sending the incorrect message TAILS. Assuming that senders believe that receivers will follow their message (with probability one) the gain for the sender from lying is 1 Euro in both versions of the deception game. In NEG, where the loss for the receiver is also 1 Euro, 44 percent of the senders lie while in NEU, where the receivers gain nothing and loose nothing compared to HEADS, the fraction of senders who lie is 75 percent. These …gures suggest that the fraction of subjects sending message TAILS is signi…cantly di¤erent across treatments which is indeed the case (p = 0:0000, 2 test).
The assumption that all senders believe that receivers will follow their message (with probability one) is unrealistic, of course. It is therefore more meaningful to condition the chosen message on the belief of the sender. To do so, we classi…ed the senders into two groups, depending on their answer to Q1: In the …rst group we include all senders who answered Q1 with values between 0 and 49, and in the second group we put all senders who answered Q1 with values between 51 and 100. In line with Sutter (2009), we argue that sending the incorrect message TAILS within the …rst group has a di¤erent interpretation than sending the incorrect message TAILS within the second group. Row [2] of Table 3 presents the relative frequencies of sending the incorrect message TAILS contingent on the answer to Q1 having a value larger than 50. In NEG, 56 percent of the senders lie according to this modi…ed lying de…nition while in NEU 82 percent of the senders send the incorrect message TAILS. The frequency of lie-telling according to this modi…ed lying de…nition is again signi…cantly di¤erent across treatments (p = 0:001, 2 test). These results are in line with the …ndings in the previous literature on cheap-talk sender-receiver games indicating that people are sensitive to the material consequences for themselves and for the other party when deciding to lie. See Gneezy (2005) , Erat and Gneezy (2012), Gibson et al. (2013) and Gneezy et al. (2013) , for instance.
Row [3] of Table 3 reports the relative frequencies of receivers actually following the sender's message, and there is no signi…cant di¤erence across the two treatments (p = 0:389, 2 test). This is not surprising because the receivers have no information about the payo¤s of the two players associated with the di¤erent outcomes in any of the two treatments.
Row [4] of Table 3 shows the means of the answers to Q1. In NEG senders think that around 57 receivers (out of 100) and in NEU senders believe that 69 (out of 100) follow their message. The di¤erences between the means across the treatments are statistically signi…cant (p = 0:0001, Kruskal-Wallis). This is in line with Camerer et al. (1989) , who argue that it is di¢ cult for an informed party to neglect own information (i.e., the non-aligned payo¤ structure in NEG and the aligned payo¤ structure in NEU ) when forming expectations about how an uninformed party will behave. Values in parentheses correspond to the actual number of observations. Table 4 reports the means of the reported sums in DICE grouped by distributional preference type. Sel…sh subjects report on average 43.39, altruists report on average 43.13 and inequality averse subjects report on average 40.17. These …gures suggest that there is no signi…cant di¤erence across distributional preference types in the frequency and extend of lying. This is con…rmed by statistical tests (p = 0:4850; Kruskal-Wallis). Values in parentheses correspond to the actual number of observations.
Test of Hypotheses

Result 1:
In line with Hypothesis 1, there is no systematic di¤ erence across distributional preference types in the frequency and extend of lying in the dice-rolling task. Figure 4 shows the proportions of senders who sent the incorrect message TAILS in the NEG and the NEU version of the deception game, grouped by distributional preference type and contingent on the answer to Q1 being larger than 50. 16 In NEU, 77 percent of the sel…sh subjects, 87 percent of the altruists and 86 percent of the inequality averse subjects lie. These …gures suggest that -in line with the theoretical prediction -there is no signi…cant di¤erence in lying behavior in NEU across distributional preference types. The pairwise comparisons across types con…rm this suspicion: For SEL vs. ALT Fisher's exact test yields p = 0:363; for SEL vs. IAV we get p = 1:000; and for ALT vs. IAV the same test yields p = 1:000. We therefore conclude:
Result 2: In line with Hypothesis 2, there is no systematic di¤ erence across distributional preference types in the frequency of lying in the NEU version of the deception game.
The proportion of lies within the group of sel…sh subjects is 75 percent in NEG and 77 percent in NEU. These …gures suggest that -in line with the theoretical prediction -there is no signi…cant di¤erence in lying behavior of sel…sh subjects between NEG and NEU. Again, this is con…rmed by statistical tests (p = 1:000, Fisher's exact).
Result 3:
In line with Hypothesis 3, there is no systematic di¤ erence in the frequency of lying of sel…sh subjects between the NEG and NEU version of the deception game.
The proportion of lies within the group of altruistic subjects is 32 percent in NEG and 87 percent in NEU. These …gures suggest that -in line with the theoretical prediction -there is a signi…cant di¤erence in the frequency of lie-telling of altruistic subjects between NEG and NEU. The pairwise comparison across treatments con…rms this conjecture: For altruistic subjects the di¤erence between NEG and NEU in the frequency of dishonest messages is highly signi…cant (p = 0:000, Fisher's exact).
Result 4:
In line with Hypothesis 4, the frequency of lying among altruistic subjects is lower in the NEG than in the NEU version of the deception game.
The proportions of lies within the group of inequality averse subjects is 58 percent in NEG and 86 percent in NEU. Although the absolute di¤erence in the frequency of lying of IAV subjects between NEG and NEU is large, statistical tests do not detect a signi…cant treatment e¤ect for this group of subjects (p = 0:333, Fisher's exact). Here, the lack of statistical signi…cance is probably due to the small number of observations in treatment NEU. 17 Result 5: In contrast with hypothesis 5, the frequency of lying among inequality averse subjects is not signi…cantly lower in the NEG than in the NEU version of the deception game.
In NEG, 32 percent of the altruistic subjects, 58 percent of the inequality averse subjects and 75 percent of the sel…sh subjects lie. These …gures suggest that -in line with the theoretical prediction -there is a signi…cant difference in lying behavior in NEG between sel…sh and altruistic subjects and between sel…sh and inequality averse subjects. The pairwise comparisons across types con…rm that the di¤erence in the frequency of lying between SEL and ALT subjects is highly signi…cant (p = 0:007; Fisher's exact), but the tests fail to detect a signi…cant di¤erence in the frequency of lying between SEL and IAV subjects (p = 0:438; Fisher's exact). 18 Result 6: In line with Hypothesis 6, the frequency of lying in the NEG version of the deception game is higher for sel…sh subjects than for altruistic subjects. In contrast with Hypothesis 6, the frequency of lying in NEG is not signi…cantly higher for sel…sh subjects than for inequality averse subjects. The results presented in this paper indicate that pro-social subjects lie less when lying hurts another party but do not lie less than sel…sh subjects in environments where lying helps the liar but has no e¤ects on the payo¤s of others. This …nding suggests that the norm of distributive justice is uncorrelated with the truth-telling norm at the individual level. Indeed, with our data we were not able to reject our null hypothesis that lying costs -whatever their origin -are distributed similarly across agents of di¤erent distributional preference types. If the …ndings of this paper are con…rmed in future experimental research, they have positive and negative implications for the selection of agents for jobs in markets plagued by asymmetric information. The negative side of our …ndings is that screening agents along a single dimension of morality does not necessarily yield moral popes: An agent who has a long history of pro-social behavior (documented, for instance, by an impressive track record of volunteer work in his or her CV) might still be inclined to be dishonest when dishonesty helps the liar but does not have negative consequences for relevant others. The positive side of our …ndings is that agents who have been selected because of their pro-sociality are, on average, more likely to be inclined to take the consequences of their behavior for others into account when deciding whether to stay honest in a business relation.
Talking about payment we are speaking of Tokens.
Conversion rat is: 5 Tokens = 1 Euro Each of your decisions is a choice between alternative "left" and alternative "right". Each of your decisions is a choice over allocations between you and your passive person.
Example: You could be asked whether you like to choose alternative left, in which case you receive 5 tokens and your passive person receives 7.5 tokens, or alternative right in which case you receive 5 tokens and your passive person also receives 5 tokens. This decision problem would be presented on the screen as follows: You are asked to make 10 such decisions in part 1. At the end of the experiment, one of these 10 decisions will be randomly chosen as payo¤ relevant. Your payo¤ for this part is calculated as follows:
Payo¤ as active person: Suppose the above mentioned decision problem was chosen as payo¤ relevant and you have chosen alternative "right". You would then receive 5 tokens as active person and your passive person receives 5 tokens.
Payo¤ as passive person: Just like your passive person receives tokens from your decision without doing anything for it, you receive tokens from another participant's decision without doing anything for it, that is you are the passive person for this other participant. It is assured that you will not get the same person as active and passive person. That is, if person X is your passive person, you will certainly not get person X as active person.
Your total payo¤ for part 1 is calculated as the sum of your payo¤ as active person and your payo¤ as passive person. Attention: your decisions only in ‡uence your payo¤ as active person. Your payo¤ as passive person depends solely on the decisions of another participant.
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[Instructions for DICE]
Part 2
Your task in part 2 is to throw a die and report the outcome on the computer screen. You have 15 seconds time to throw the die and report the outcome on the screen. Please press next throw after you reported the outcome. You are asked to throw the die and report the outcome on the screen 10 times. At the end your reported outcomes are summed up to your "summed score" of this part.
Payo¤ information
You receive your summed score 1:1 in tokens, paying you with 5 Tokens = 1 Euro as payo¤ for part 2. 
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Experimental Instructions: NEU and NEG
In the following we provide an English translation of our originally German instructions. We provide the instructions and the decision sheets for the treatment NEU here. The instructions and decision sheets for the treatment NEG are identical to those for treatment NEU (except for the payo¤ s of the receiver when the receiver chooses TAILS). German instructions are available on request.
[General Instructions, at start of session]
Welcome to an experiment on decision making. We thank you for your participation!
The experiment consists of two decision making parts. A research foundation has provided the funds for conducting the experiment. You can earn a considerable amount of money by participating. The text below will tell you how the amount you earn will be determined.
No Talking Allowed
Please do not talk to any other participant until the experiment is over. If there is anything that you don't understand, please raise your hand. An experimenter will approach you and clarify your questions in private. In about ten minutes this document will also be read aloud (by an experimenter).
Anonymity
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the experiment. Neither the experimenters nor the other subjects will be able to link you to any of your decisions. In order to keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant. The following means help to guarantee anonymity:
Non-Computerized Experiment and Private Code
The task you have to complete during the experiment is conducted in private on a printed form; that is, the experiment is not computerized. You have drawn a small sealed envelope from a box upon entering the room. PLEASE DO NOT OPEN YOUR ENVELOPE BEFORE THE EXPER-IMENT STARTS. Your envelope contains your participation number. We will refer to it as "your private code" in the sequel. Your private code is the only identi…cation used during the experiment and you will also need it to collect your cash payments.
Cash Payments
During the experiment we shall not speak of Euros but rather of Talers. At the end of the experiment the total amount of Talers you have earned will be converted to Euros at the following rate:
10 Taler = 1 Euro
Cash payments can be collected from Monday onwards in room w3.29 on the third ‡oor (West) of this building. You will present your private code to an admin sta¤ person (Mrs. xy) and you will receive your cash payment in exchange. The admin sta¤ person will not know who has done what and why, nor how payments were generated. No experimenter will be present in the room when you collect your money. Also, the private codes of this experiment will be mixed up with the codes of other experiments. This will again help to guarantee that the amount you earn cannot be linked to your decisions. Mrs. xy is available from Monday to Friday between 9 a.m. and 11 a.m., as well as between 2 p.m. and 3 p.m. in room w3.29 on the third ‡oor (West) of this building. Please collect your earnings within a weak (you …nd those details also on the card displaying your private code).
Two Groups
Before the experiment starts, the participants in this room will be randomly divided into two groups of equal size. The groups are called Group A and Group B. Members of Group A will be seated in this room, members of Group B will be seated in the adjacent room.
Role Assignment and Start of the Experiment
After the instructions at hand and the detailed instructions have been read aloud and all questions have been answered you (and all other participants in this room) will be asked to open the sealed envelope you drew from the box when entering this room. The envelope contains a card with your private code. The code ends with a number. If this number is even, you are a member of Group A, if it is odd, you are a member of Group B. Members of Group A are asked to take a seat at one of chairs in this room. Members of Group B will be escorted to the adjacent room and asked to take a seat there. Then the decision sheets will be handed out and the experiment starts.
[Instructions for The Equality Equivalence Test]
Matching
Each member of Group A is anonymously paired with a member of Group B. The matching is 1:1; that is, each member of Group A is exactly matched with one member of Group B and vice versa. You will never learn the identity of the member of the other group you are paired with. In the same way, the member of the other group you are paired with will not learn your identity. In the following we call the member of the other group you are matched with the other person.
Decision Tasks
Each member of Group A and each member of Group B will be asked to make 10 decisions. Each of the 10 decisions is a choice between the alternatives LEFT and RIGHT. Each alternative has consequences for your own payment and for the payment to the other person you are matched with. Each member of Group A and each member of Group B will be asked to make 10 of such decisions in total. The payo¤s out of this part of the experiment are determined as follows:
Payment from your decisions: For each participant one of the 10 decision situations is selected separately and at random, and the alternative chosen in the respective situation will then be paid out. If for example the situation above would be selected and if you had chosen in the above situation the alternative RIGHT, then you would receive 20 Taler and the other person would receive 20 Taler too.
Payment as other person:
As the other person you are matched with receives Taler from your decision, without doing anything for it, you also receive Taler from another participant in the experiment, without doing anything for it; that is, you are for another participant the other person. We will ensure that if person X is your other person, then for sure you will not be the other person of person X.
In the case of wrong decisions (no alternative in a row or both alternatives in a row are marked) you get no payment from this part of the experiment and the payment to the other person is determined randomly (by randomly implementing one of the two alternatives).
After you have made your decision on the decision sheet, put the decision sheet into the envelope and wait until an experimenter will collect it. Pay attention that the envelope is not marked in any way.
Decision Sheet
The decision sheet will look as shown below. Note that this page is NOT the decision sheet. The decision sheet will be handed out to you at the start of the experiment.
Please enter your private code (you will get no payment out of the experiment in case the private code is missing or wrong):
. 
Matching
Each member of Group B is anonymously paired with a member of Group A. The matching is 1:1; that is, each member of Group B is exactly matched with one member of Group A and vice versa. You will never learn the identity of the member of the other group you are paired with. In the same way, the member of the other group you are paired with will not learn your identity. In the following we call the member of the other group you are matched with the other person.
Before the start of the experiment we made a coin toss and the outcome of the coin toss is HEADS.
The other person you are paired with is not informed about the outcome of the coin toss but the other person is aware about the fact that you know the outcome of the coin toss.
We now ask you to send a message to the other person. You have the choice between the following two alternatives:
Message 1: "The outcome of the coin toss is HEADS." Message 2: "The outcome of the coin toss is TAILS."
Your message will be shown to the other person, and then he or she will be asked to choose between HEADS and TAILS. The choice of the other person will determine your payo¤ and the payo¤ of the other person in this part of the experiment:
If the other person chooses the actual outcome of the coin toss, HEADS, then you will receive 20 Taler and he or she will receive 30 Taler.
If the other person chooses TAILS, then you will receive 30 Taler and he or she will receive 30 Taler.
The other person is not aware of the payo¤ consequences for both players when he or she chooses between HEADS or TAILS. The only information the other person has is the content of the message you send to him or her. Even after the decision of the other person he or she will only learn his or her own payo¤ from the chosen alternative.
The message I will send to the other person is (please mark a message):
O Message 1: "The outcome of the coin toss is HEADS." O Message 2: "The outcome of the coin toss is TAILS." 
Before starting this experiment, we have made a coin toss, and told the outcome of it to the other person you are paired with, but we are not going to tell it to you. After being informed of the outcome of the coin toss the other person has sent a message to you. The other person had to choose one of the following two messages: 
O HEADS O TAILS
